KHRUSHCHEV’S TREACHERY

KHRUSHCHEV’S TREACHERY

ONCE AGAIN ON THE PERSONALITY CULT
(From Bolshevik newspaper of Belarus “Vperyod” No6 (122))
On June 30, 1956, a decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU “On overcoming the personality cult and its consequences” was adopted, - directively spreading revisionism under the pretext of the criticism of the Stalin personality cult. Khrushchev’s slanderous report, which was announced at a session of the XX congress of the CPSU on February 25, 1956, was placed as the basis of the decision. This report was a recognition of revisionism and neo-Trotskyism at an official level by the heads of the CPSU, and also a declaration of a change of policy in the general line of the party from proletarian to petty-bourgeois.
The CRITICISM of the so-called Stalin personality cult was the main ideological diversion of the Khrushchevites. It served as a starting point and a basis of subsequent ideological diversions: the termination of the class struggle after the liquidation of the Kulak class (class of wealthier peasants), an occurrence of a new generality and leading, in turn, to the occurrence of an all-peoples state, a party of all people etc. The Khrushchevites carefully prepared for their main ideological diversion. Inside the Bolshevik party, unfortunately, the ground had not been weeded enough to prevent such preparation from being carried out.
During J.V.Stalin's life, the general line of the party of Bolsheviks was strictly scientific, based on Marxism-Leninism, without petty-bourgeois distortions and unswervingly proletarian. Its correctness was watched strictly by the proletarian leader J.V.Stalin - the true pupil and colleague of V.I.Lenin. Its correctness has been proved by the practical affairs of the Soviet people and the successes achieved by them during J.V.Stalin's lifetime, and also by the history of the life of our society after his death, which led eventually to the restoration of capitalism.
Following the proletarian general line during J.V.Stalin's life, the party of Bolsheviks seemed homogeneous and monolithic. But it only seemed like that and that actually it objectively could not be such, owing to the heterogeneity of its structure according to social origin, and because of a variety of world views and political consciousness of its members and their various types of understanding and attitudes to Marxism-Leninism. If one examines members of the party from a position of their attitude to the proletarian general line of the party adopted during J.V.Stalin’s life, in it were both its true supporters, and imaginary ones. The latter in words supported the proletarian general line, but deep down did not accept it and aspired to change the direction of the general line over to petty-bourgeois, (i.e. they were the carriers of the petty-bourgeois line).... After the Great Patriotic War they numerically prevailed in the party, nevertheless, they could not act openly for change in the general line over onto a petty-bourgeois one, since they were organizationally finished off, and genius Stalin would expose them, and healthy forces would purge them out of the party. Proceeding from their own internal petty-bourgeois essence, they did not want to reconcile themselves with the proletarian general line, however, learning by the experience of the Trotskyites and other enemies of the working people, they operated in a sneaky manner. And to remove all suspicion from themselves, they imitated efficiency and operated in a ultra-pseudo-leftist “hurrah-revolutionary” like way, i.e. a lot of noise and din, but little sense and use coming out of it, indeed doing more harm than good.
? Carriers of the petty-bourgeois line were in the entire party including its leading bodies and even in its Presidium. Khrushchev and Mikoyan were the most important officials from these carriers in the structure of the Presidium. They believed J.V.Stalin to be the main obstacle in the way of a change in direction of the general line of the party onto a petty-bourgeois footing. Therefore, they stretched as far as even drawing up a plot with the purpose of murdering J.V.Stalin. Mikoyan admitted this in 1960 to Enver Hoxha (Enver Hoxha. “The Khrushchevites. Memoirs in 2 parts. Pub."8 Nentori”, Tirana, 1984, part. 1, page 31; part. 2, page 125). J.V.Stalin's death untied the hands of Khrushchev and his companions. Having seized power, they without much difficulty began changing the direction of the party line. However, they did not immediately start changing policy sharply. For they understood, that in order to prevent the worst consequences happening to themselves, the process of changing policy should be gradual and for this purpose it was necessary to carry out the groundwork first. They put forth a task for such preparation: to sow doubt in party members’ and workers’ minds in the correctness of the way by which Soviet people had built socialism under J.V.Stalin's leadership. But this was only possible to achieve only having struck the most sensitive areas. One such area was in the area of belief by members of the party and workers in the great proletarian leader J.V.Stalin, in his words and deeds.
Khrushchev and his companions also had other motives for attacking Stalin. These include first of all, Khrushchev’s personal ambitions (he tore up to the top ranks of power), as well as his partners’ ambitions. They believed themselves to be greater than Stalin. Undoubtedly, Khrushchev and his ilk with him were people certainly extraordinary, gifted, maybe, and talented even. Nevertheless, despite this, they were a few grades lower than J.V.Stalin as politicians and statesmen. Only close to Stalin did they seem more significant, than they actually were. He suppressed them with his own intelligence, willpower, thorough knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and his dialectics, his wisdom based on this knowledge and foresight, the correct and effective solving of practical affairs and the skill in finding correct solutions in the most confusing situations.
During Stalin’s lifetime, the Khruschevites were left with nothing other than against their will to participate in the construction of socialism by the route laid by genius Stalin. Such state of affairs did not suit them, touched their wounded vanity and brought about their internal embitterment. Khrushchev also had in addition a personal motive for attacking Stalin; he could not forgive Joseph Vissarionovich for his refusal to rehabilitate his son who had committed grave crimes. This motive aggravated Khrushchev’s embitterment even more. This embitterment developed in the spirit of the poison of anti-Stalinism. Compelled to hide this poison deeply in the deaf darkness of their own double-dealing souls, the Khrushchevites began to spread it openly after Stalin's death consistently, deliberately and well-dosed out. The first dose of such poison was the statement by the Khrushchevites about the restoration by them of the Leninist principle of collective leadership by the party and the state. However, at first, they openly did not say, who, in their opinion had trampled on these principles, however they meant, that Stalin had done it. He had supposedly usurped authority, individually decided and disposed of everything, showed voluntarism. From here supposedly proceeded all the deficiencies that were in the national economy.
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The next dose was the case of the Kremlin doctors (the doctor’s plot - trans.). On January 13, 1953, a government message was circulated about doctors who were engaged in poisonings. And on April 4 1953, a message appeared from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR about the complete rehabilitation of the arrested doctors. Afterwards, members and candidates for membership into the Central Committee became acquainted with the documents, which in addition, testified to Stalin's direct participation in this case, demanding more thorough questioning.
Further, the Khrushchevites accused Stalin of worsening relations with Yugoslavia, motivated by the fact that not all possibilities were exhausted for settling controversial questions and that this they say, led? Yugoslavia into the hostile camp. Thus, they rejected the decisions of the Information Bureau of 1948 and 1949 where Tito’s revisionism was condemned. For acknowledgement of their correctness, the Khrushchevites even created a special commission led by Shepilov for defining the social, economic and political system of Yugoslavia. Of course, the commission “successfully” solved the task allocated to it and, ostensibly, after carefully studying the material, came to the conclusion that Yugoslavia meets the requirements, which Marxism-Leninism sets for socialist states.
Having “enriched” the treasury of Marxism-Leninism with the idea of peaceful co-existence of states with different systems, the Khrushchevites blamed Stalin who had supposedly allowed only peaceful co-operation, however he thus emphasized, that while there is capitalism, wars are inevitable. Such inconsistency, in their opinion, affected international relations and supposedly put under doubt the policy of peaceful co-existence in general. Thus, the Khrushchevites made pains to show themselves as the pathbreakers of the idea of peaceful co-existence.
?The main item of the charges of the Khrushchevites was Stalin's so-called arbitrariness in the repressions allegedly carried out by him against completely innocent people. The way in which the Khrushchevites wailed on about the enemies of the working people, one can only grieve for ones native and closest people. And presentation by the Khrushchevites of those people condemned in the 193Î-s for counterrevolutionary crimes of the enemies of the working people as innocent people subjected to repression once again proves, that those enemies seemed as though they were spiritual brothers of the Khrushchevites.
By mid 1953, the first exiles started returning. For simplifying the rehabilitation process of his "spiritual brothers”, Khrushchev having already become first secretary of the Central Committee, achieved in the middle of September, 1953 the adoption by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of a decree giving the right to the Supreme court of the USSR to reconsider under the protest of the General public prosecutor, the decisions of the former colleagues of the OGPU, of three of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and of the special meeting of the NKVD-MGB-MVD of the USSR. Further, Khrushchev gave the General public prosecutor, Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Justice an instruction to review the cases against people convicted for counterrevolutionary crimes. They were not slow in following this instruction, about which they informed on February 1, 1954 to Khrushchev, having presented it in a report. The Supreme court urgently began the rehabilitation of enemies of the working people. So, in April 1954, he reconsidered the Leningrad case and rehabilitated the convicted, allegedly, for lack of criminal evidence. In 1955 the court rehabilitated party members and statesmen Bubnov, Kosarev, Êîsior, Krilyenko, Postishev, Rudzutak, Chaplin, Chubar, Ekhe and Blucher's military leaders, Gamarnik, Egorov, Tukhachevsky, Uborevich and Yakir.
Having decided to completely discredit Stalin at the XX congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev before the congress carried out his spadework in the Presidium of the Central Committee. At one of his sittings, he, under a demagogical pretext suggested the forming of a special commission for an investigation into Stalin’s activity. Enjoying the support of Bulganin, Saburov, Pervukhin, Kirichenko and Suslov, Khrushchev managed in the Presidium of the Central Committee, to form the commission led by Secretary of the Central Committee, Pospelov, Aristov, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, Shvernik and the deputy chairman of the KPK under the Central Committee of Komarov. The members of the commission by their own thinking were raging anti-Stalinists, anticommunists and anti-Soviets having petty-bourgeois views and political consciousness. By virtue of this, the members of Pospelovite commission appeared as Khrushchev’s authorized representatives and conscientiously carried out his task to slander Stalin's personality and activity. When drawing up the report they started out from a position of the petty bourgeoisie offended by the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was consistently implemented by Stalin, and judged his personality and activity using the criteria of judgement used by bourgeois figures. In particular, they used the following sly method. When judging those people convicted in the 1930-s, they rejected the main thing - the reason for their arrests for counterrevolutionary crimes. But they stuck out their membership of the party, the high posts of the arrested persons and their services before Soviet power. Using this as a basis, the commission quickly announced all those convicted for counterrevolutionary crimes during Stalin’s lifetime as innocent and gave the resulting final figures of all those subjected to repression, which simply deafened unprepared people. Without doubt, the Pospelovite commission, when drawing up the report, used slanderous fabrications of their spiritual father, Trotsky who proceeded with poisonous saliva at only the mention of Stalin’s name alone.

(To be continued)
G.S. FILLIPOV, KRASNOYARSK ("Workers'-and-Peasants' Sickle and Hammer ", No26, June, 2004)